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Abstract
Does the common currency promote goods market integration within the
EMU? We argue that such an effect is likely, but that the mechanism
typically proposed – lover costs of arbitrage because of increased price
transparency – is likely to be of minor importance. Instead we sketch a
duopoly model which stresses that lover possibility of future real exchange
rate variability lowers the option value of being able to price discriminate.
The euro would promote market integration because it is less valuable for
firms to segment markets. In addition we argue that fairness concerns and
less risk associated with third party arbitrage may be potentially
important.
Keywords: exchange rate pass-through; law of one price; EMU; price
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RICHARD FRIBERG
KÖZÖS PÉNZ, KÖZÖS PIAC?
Összefoglaló
Igaz-e az, hogy a közös valuta bevezetése az európai gazdasági és pénz-
ügyi unió országaiban elősegíti a termékpiacok integrációját? A tanul-
mány megmutatja, hogy egy ilyen hatás valószínű, de a legtöbbet hangoz-
tatott mechanizmus – az árak könnyebb összehasonlíthatóságából fakadó
arbitrázs költség csökkenés – minden bizonnyal csak kis szerepet játszik
majd. A tanulmány felvázol egy duopol piaci modellt, amely azt hangsú-
lyozza, hogy a kisebb várható jövőbeni árfolyam-változékonyság csökkenti
az árdiszkrimináció lehetőségének opciós értékét. Az euró azért segíti elő a
piacok integrációját, mert ezután a cégeknek kevésbé lesz érdemes szeg-
mentálniuk a piacokat. A fentiek mellett a tanulmány megmutatja, hogy a
méltányossági megfontolások, illetve a harmadik fél által végzett arbit-
rázzsal kapcsolatos kisebb kockázat szerepe is potenciálisan fontos lehet.3
1 INTRODUCTION
Euro notes and coins have now replaced the national currency in the EMU.
Will this be a catalyst in creating a common market in the EMU area? Ac-
cording to the European Commission and many practitioners the answer is
yes. The mechanism is typically argued to be increased price transparency.
An example of this reasoning is The Economist (2001) which state that
“the greater transparency the single currency brings to prices will make a
big difference to the way business is conducted. Simple economic theory
suggests that savvy consumers will look across European markets and note
where the price of a good or service is lowest. They will then either pur-
chase the good or service there, conducting a form of what economists call
“arbitrage”; or they will use the information to prevail upon their more ex-
pensive local provider to bring the price down… In the past, manufacturers
have been able to maintain price differentials because their customers
found it difficult to compare prices. With the euro, it will become much
easier [to compare prices].”
Many economists are uncomfortable with this emphasis on transparency.
Do potential arbitrageurs really find it so difficult to compare prices that is
matters for why prices of typical consumer goods differ across Europe?
Rather, a common view among economists is that prices differ because
costs, demand patterns and the strength of competition vary across coun-
tries and price differentials need to become very large before they domi-
nate the costs associated with arbitrage of consignor goods.
This paper analyses the lessons of recent research for the impact a common
currency on market integration. We show how the latter view can be rec-
onciled with a market integrating effect of a common currency. We first
document that many goods markets are segmented along national borders
and trade costs create a band of inaction  within relative prices can move
without triggering arbitrage. The following section examines how a com-
mon currency might narrow that band. We proceed to analysis of endoge-
nous market segmentation, how might a common currency affect the in-
centives to create a band of inaction?4
2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON SEGMENTATION OF MARKETS ALONG NATIONAL
BORDERS
In a tradition that originates with Cournot and Marshall we define a market
as an area within which prices rapidly converge to equality, correcting for
costs of transportation. If prices were much lower in one location it would
pay for an arbitrageur to buy it there and resell in the high price region. In-
deed, for many commodities traded on exchanges, such as gold, arbitrage
rapidly eliminates any price differences over and above transport costs.
However, for consumer goods the stylised fact seems to be that price dif-
ferentials across markets diminish at a “surprisingly” slow rate.
1 In an in-
fluential paper Engel and Rogers (1996) show that for two cities to be on
opposite sides of the US-Canadian border adds as much variability in rela-
tive prices of narrowly defined price indexes as if the cities were 75 000
miles apart. The main conclusion is that both distance and the border mat-
ter – and that the border effect is very large. Engel and Rogers (2001) ex-
amine European data, again finding a huge border effect. Prices that are
sticky in the currency of consumers coupled with exchange rate variability
are an important explanation for this border effect. We can express the
price difference between markets as
p – ep*
where is p is the price in the Home country, p* the foreign price and e the
current exchange rate. Given that the median interval of price changes is
yearly (Taylor, 1999) it is clear that a common currency will lead to less
relative price variability since e then will be stable.
Exchange rate variability alone can not explain the border effect however,
there must also be some barriers to arbitrage. The lower these barriers are,
the narrower is the band of inaction within which relative prices can move
without triggering arbitrage. Transport costs and various formal and infor-
mal trade barriers are obvious candidates. These barriers are large for many
goods – also within the EU. Evidence of market segmentation comes from
detailed industry studies (such as Goldberg and Verboven’s, 2001, study of
European car markets or Haskel and Wolf’s, 2001, study of prices at the
furniture retailer IKEA), from studies of large data sets on prices of the
                    
1  See Rogof (1996) for a survey and Taylor (2001) for a methodological discussion.5
same or similar goods in different markets (such a Crucini et al’s, 2001,
analysis of Eurostat data Rogers et al, 2001 of data from the Economist
Intelligence Unit), from antitrust cases (with the classic case of United
Brands v. Commission, 1978 (bananas) and the blocked merger between
truck makers Volvo and Scania as but two examples) and from studies of
trade flows (see Head and Mayer, 2000 and Anderson and Van Wincoop,
2001 for a methodological discussion). To some extent the results conform
to economic intuition – deviations tend to be lower if goods can be char-
acterised as traded or have a large proportion of traded inputs (Crucini et
al, 2001) and European price differentials have decreased during the
19902, as expected after the “1992” program to remove remaining barriers
to the free flow of gods within the EU (Rogers et al, 2001). There is pre-
ciously little empirical evidence on the relative importance of various bar-
riers and it is probably fair to say that the sources of market segmentation
in Europe remain somewhat of a mystery. Can a common currency be an
important barrier?
3 WHY A COMMON CURRENCY CAN NARROW THE BAND OF INACTION
There are two ways through which arbitrage of consumer products can take
place – either consumers themselves buy the product in the cheaper loca-
tion or a third party does so and resells it. It is beyond doubt that individu-
als find it easier to compare two prices that are expressed in the same cur-
rency, the question is if we believe this to be quantitatively important – an
issue that can only be settled by empirical work. In Asplund and Friberg
(2001) we make use of a “natural experiment” and examine the pricing in
three Scandinavian duty-free shops. In these, each good has price tags is
several currencies. We thus examine deviations from the law of one price
for identical goods at the same location and time and with full information
about prices. The question about the relative importance of different barri-
ers is then easy because there is only one barrier – price setting in different
currencies. There are indeed non-trivial deviations from the law of one
price – up to 15 percent. Figure 1 illustrates the deviations from the law of
one price 1 litre of Smirnoff vodka in the on-board duty-free shops of the
Viking Line ferries that connect Sweden and Finland. We also plot the
bands of inaction created by costs of exchanging currency in the on-board
exchange is done on shore (or using credit card).
It appears that costs of exchanging currency on-board are an important bar-
rier in this setting, the band of inaction created is sizeable and deviations
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however, the costs of exchanging on shore or using a credit card in the
other currency quite narrow bounds and the deviation is almost always
outside this band. A common currency here would have implied a much
tighter hold of the law of one price and in this sense the results confirm
that a common currency greatly reduces relative price variability compared
to a benchmark of a floating exchange rate.
However, these data do not give much support to the idea that pricing in
different currencies is an important explanation for price discrimination
across national borders for other consumer goods. Firstly, in the duty-free
shops the average deviation from the law of one price is small for most
goods and often not statistically significant from 0. Sometimes it is cheaper
in Finnish markka and sometimes in Swedish kronor. Secondly, since the
cognitive costs of comparing prices should be independent of the prices of
goods (it should be no more difficult to compare 10 Euros to 10 US dollars
than 1000 Euros to 1000 US dollars) rule-of-thumb behaviour predicts
more narrow bounds on big-ticket items or goods that are bought fre-
quently. Since big-ticket items are typically the only ones for which it is
profitable for a single consumer to buy from another country, the duty-free
data (on relatively low cost and infrequently bought goods) are likely to
present an upper bound on the size of deviations that can be explained by
pricing in different currencies.
Two of the duty-free shops mentioned that the main pressure to change
prices was customer complaints about the price differentials rather than ar-
bitrage. Also in other cases this is likely to be an important channel for
market integration. For instance, when the magazine The Economist moves
to a common Euro cover price it is hard to imagine that arbitrage by con-
sumers is a concern. However it is well established from experimental
work that consumers care about fairness (see e.g. Rabin, 2002, for a dis-
cussion). Long-term relations between firms and customers are the norm
(see e.g. Blinder et al, 1998) and buyers are likely to be sensitive to what
they may see as sellers taking advantage of them by “unfair” pricing prac-
tises. Customers may not be sufficiently interested in fairness to calculate
common currency price differentials and in any case you need a time series
to see price differentials are the outcome of attempts at price discrimina-
tion (which may be seen as unfair) rather than just being a by-product of
exchange rate variability coupled with sticky prices. In contrast, when
prices are expressed in the same currency, price differentials are immedi-
ately obvious. Price discrimination is a common practice – it appears that
people are not upset by for instance discounts to low income groups. How-8
ever, some introspection yields that individuals are less liable to oversee
price discrimination on national grounds – think of a restaurant that
charges based on what passport you have. It is hard to know how much this
will matter quantitatively – for publicly posted prices of goods distributed
by the manufacturer and where there are low possibilities of arguing that
marginal cost differences are the explanation for price differences it may
be of substantial importance in equalising posted prices. Note that so far
there appears little that can be archived by a common currency that a per-
fectly fixed exchange rate couldn’t bring about.
The other channel through which a common currency might affect market
integration is through arbitrage conducted by third parties. Transparency
and fairness should matter little here – rather costs related to distribution
are likely to be a main barrier to arbitrage.
2 Even though EU case law gives
substantial rights to arbitrageurs, vertical integration (or vertical restrains
such as exclusive territories) remains an important barrier to arbitrage.
Take the furniture retailer IKEA as an example, IKEA retails only through
their own stores. Arbitrageurs would have to buy at retail prices in another
country and in all likelihood have to sell at a substantial rebate in order to
induce consumers to buy from them, rather than from IKEA. One reason
for such a rebate is that counterfeits and damaged goods appear common in
third party arbitrage – the possibility that the good is inferior quality obvi-
ously raises the price differential needed for arbitrage to be profitable. A
common currency may have a market integrating effect since increased
stability of relative prices is likely to increase the incentives to invest, in
reputation and distribution channels, for risk averse or liquidity con-
strained arbitrageurs. Lastly, a number of papers by Andrew Rose, for in-
stance Glick and Rose (2002) find that a common currency promotes trade.
It is hard to know how relevant this evidence is for EMU countries and we
learn little about the mechanisms. Nevertheless, it takes no great leap of
                    
2 There is little empiricalevidence on the extent and price impact of parallel imports, as
stressed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) our profession has focused to much on
consumer arbitrage. One exception is Ganslandt and Maskus (2001) who examine
the natural experiment of when Sweden opened up for parallel imports of
pharmaceutical products, indeed  finding substantial price effects. An important
element of this case  was that the parallel importers had access to the same outlets
(state owned pharmaceutical monopoly) as the goods that went through the regular
channel.9
faith to believe that, if a common currency promotes trade in general, it
also facilitates trade in secondary markets.
4 ENDOGENOUS SEGMENTATION
Many of the barriers that segment markets are endogenous – restrictions in
parallel imports, different brand names and product specifications in dif-
ferent countries as vell as far reaching vertical restrains exist because of
deliberate choices by firms, as a reading of the EU antitrust cases will
make clear. How are such choices affected by a common currency? In
Friberg (2001) I show how lower expected real exchange rate variability
leads to market integration by firms. The intuition is that third degree price
discrimination is profitable when the optimal prices to two consumer
groups differ. Except in very specific cases (notably constant elastic de-
mand) real exchange rate changes will affect the relation between the op-
timal prices on two markets. Large swings in the real exchange rate be-
tween two similar markets thus create incentives for market segmentation.
The more variability, the more valuable will it be to segment and “price-to-
market”. If a common currency takes away the possibility of large future
swings in the real exchange rate, it consequently takes away much of the
incentive for market segmentation. For instance, as the pound has appreci-
ated against the euro, cars have become substantially more expensive in
Britain than in continental Europe. Clearly, in a period of a strong pound it
has been valuable to be able to have a different price in the UK than on the
continent.
To make the intuition more precise let us sketch a simple duopoly exten-
sion of the model in Fiberg (2001). The setup is related to Friberg and
Martensen (2001) where we model a Cournot duopoly and examine how
the incentives to segment markets depend on transport costs between those
markets.
3 The mechanism of interest is how the possibility of exchange
rate swings affect the expected benefits of segmenting markets – should
the firms for instance invest in different brand names and product specifi-
                    
3 While the link between exchange rate variability and the decision to segment is new,
there are a number of related literatures. In particular we relate to work on price
discrimination under competition (see for instance Corts, 1998), sptial pricing
strategies (Thisse and Vives, 1988) and „segmented markets” models in international
economics (Brander and Krugman, 1983 and much subsequent work).10
cations in the different markets, and thereby have a greater possibility to
price discriminate?
Consider two firms, one based in France and one in Italy. The model is a
simple partial equilibrium model of “reciprocal markets” – both firms sell
on both markets. The timing is assumed to be 1) firms simultaneously de-
cide on whether to segment, 2) the exchange rate is revealed, 3) prices are
set and profits are realised. To keep issues as simple as possible assume
that the costs of segmenting are fixed: K
1 and K
F respectively. It a firm has
taken the cost of segmenting markets is sets prices on both markets without
constraint whereas if it has not segmented, it optimises subject to a con-
straint that the price if its good should be equal in France and Italy. The
exchange rate between the two countries is given by e, expressed as the
Italian lira price of French francs. There is no direct effect of Exchange
rate on demand or costs and we can thus view changes in e as real ex-
change rate changes.
Using a star to denote prices in France, p and p* are the Italian firm’s
prices, and P and P* the French firm’s corresponding prices in Italy and
France. Let c be the constant marginal costs, which are equal for both
firms. Let λ and μ be Langrange multipliers that will be set equal to 0 for a
firm that has taken the fixed cost of segmenting in a previous period. As-
sume that demand takes the simple linear form associated with Bowley (see
Martin, 2001) such that a and b are positive constants and θ ∈  (0,1) meas-
ures the degree of product differentiation. Assuming that firms compete in
prices, the Italian firm’s profit maximisation problem in stage 3, including
the constraint becomes
II
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If optimal prices differ across markets, the constraints will be binding and
the Langrange multipliers positive. We examine the Nash (Bertrand) equi-
libria in prices, such that each firm conjectures a zero response to changes
in its own prices. Solving the system of equations yielded by the four first
order conditions for profit maximisation and the relevant Langrange con-
ditions gives us optimal prices as a function of the exchange rate.
p, p*
P, P*11
Let us focus on how profits depend on the exchange rate in stage 3, knowl-
edge of this will determine choices in stage 1. Figure 2 plots how the dif-
ference in profits between different strategies (excluding the fixed cost) for
the Italian firm depend on the exchange rate. In this plot we have set γ =
0.8, a = 4, b = 1 and c = 0.2.
The upper solid line in 2 represents the increase in profits for the Italian
firm if both firms segment compared to the case where both integrate.
Clearly unconstrained profits are always higher than when prices are con-
strained to be equal across markets. The dotted line represents the increase
in profits for the Italian firm when segments but the French firm integrates,
compared to the case where both integrate. A number of points can be seen
from this very stylised framework. The first and obvious is that when the
exchange rate is equal to 1 there is no value of segmenting the markets, we
then have two markets with the same optimal price. However, as soon as
the exchange rate differs from 1 it is valuable to segment markets. Say for
instance that the fixed cost of segmenting is 0.04, the Italian firm would
then want to segment if e < 0.761 or e > 1.271, as long as the French firm
segments as well. The gain in profits from segmenting would then out-
weigh the cost – given a sufficiently high probability that the exchange
rate will be outside these bounds in period 3, a firm will thus want to seg-
ment in period 1. This leads us our second and main result; holding E(e) = 1,
making the tails of the exchange rate distribution thinner, lowers the ex-
pected value of being able to segment. If we are in an equilibrium where
both firms segment, a concentration of the probability mass to e = 1 lead
firms to integrate. The intuition is simple, by segmenting is stage 1 each
firm effectively buys an option to different prices across markets in stage
3. The lower the probability that the firm will want to exercise that option,
the less is the firm willing to pay to segment markets. A monetary union
differs from a fixed exchange rate in that the probability of future ex-
change rate realignments is much lower, if not 0. A monetary union thus
gives incentives for a firm to adjust its total strategy with respect to mar-
keting, distribution, warranties and service networks in a way that a fixed,
but adjustable, exchange rate does not. This is consistent with Parsley and
Wei’s (2001) examination of prices collected by the Economic Intelligence
Unit. They find that currency unions are associated with much greater
goods market integration than just a fixed exchange rate arrangement.
A third important result is that the benefit of segmenting depends on what
the other firm does, if the French firm integrates the gain of segmenting for
the Italian firm is lower. Interpreting this more broadly implies that inte-
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grate as well. Catalysts are likely to be firms that have a relatively high
cost of segmenting – think for instance of a new entrant, should it establish
separate brands and distribution networks for the different countries in
Europe or should it use the same brand name everywhere?
4 Many results in
studies of international oligopoly hinge on whether firms regard their
products as strategic substitutes or strategic complements (as they are in
our example).
5 That is not true in this case. We are assuming that both
firms choose to segment/integrate simultaneously and there is no room for
strategic effects related to first mover (dis)advantages. While equilibrium
prices and quantities will depend on the form of competition (price com-
petition is more fierce) the result that integrating has a negative effect on
the other firm survives also under quantity competition (which in our set-
ting implies that products are strategic substitutes). If the competitor has
the same price on the two markets this squeezes the optimal price differen-
tial for the Italian firm and the gain from price discriminating is lower.
The framework is simple and easily adapted to examining differences in
marginal costs or in the parameters of the demand functions across coun-
tries. Other factors promoting market integration in the EU can be analysed
in the setup – tax harmonisation, reductions in income differentials and
common media channels will all tend to promote price equalisation by
making optimal prices more equal. Harmonisation of technical standards,
community exhaustion of trademarks (see for instance Silhouette v. Hart-
lauer for a recent important case) and an aggressive stance by the Compe-
tition Directorate General on market segmentation (see for instance com-
mission v. Volkswagen, DaimlerChrysler or JCB for recent cases) all tend
to make it more costly to segment markets along national lines.
                    
4 Work on oligopolistic price discrimination finds a strong tendency for price
discrimination (Corts, 1998 and Thisse and Vives, 1988). We find the same if we, as
ios customary in that literature, assume that there are no direct costs of segmentation.
5 The prime example of this is the case of strategic trade policy, the optimal policy is a
subsidy to the national producer in the case of strategic substitutes (Cournot
competition between substitutes) but a tax on the national producer in the case of
strategic complements (Bertrand competition between imperfect substitutes). See
Eaton and Grossman (1986).14
5 DISCUSSION
We have examined the mechanisms by which a common currency can
promote market, arguing that more effective arbitrage due to increased
transparency is likely to be of minor importance but other mechanisms
such as endogenous segmentation my have a substantial impact. In practice
market integration may mean moving to a single retail (or wholesale) price
across Europe and use of the same brand name, product characteristics and
post-sale service. Lower incentives for endogenous segmentation are con-
sistent with the recent practices of manufactures of consumer products
such as Unilever, Danone or Nestlé to concentrate on fewer brand names
and increasingly put the parent brand name on the product. It goes without
saying that there is no reason to believe that the EMU area will become a
common market for a goods. Some markets will remain exogenously seg-
mented, and for others the gains from price discrimination are sufficiently
large for endogenous segmentation to be profitable, also under a common
currency. Nevertheless, the analysis in this paper suggests that the will see
a move towards market integration and decreased importance of national
borders for many types of traded good markets.
6
An important insight from the literature on Pricing-to-Market and the new
open economy macroeconomics is that the exchange rate can fluctuate so
much in part because it “matters so little”. National goods market are seg-
mented and exchange rate changes are not fully passed through into prices,
thus to some extent insulating the real economy from the effects of ex-
change rate fluctuations. While a general equilibrium modelling of en-
dogenous market segmentation remains far outside the scope of the present
article it may be worth to point out the feedback effect that endogenous
segmentation implies. The more the real exchange rate fluctuates, the more
is it worth for firms to be able to segment markets and the more will they
try to do so; in this sense pricing-to-market will lead to even more pricing-
                    
6 To say that a common curreny promotes market integration is not necessarily to say
that all consumers will face the same price. Let us again use The Economist as an
example. They have a common cover price in euros, but clearly most of their
revenues come from subscriptions where different forms of rebates abound
depending on work status (student rebates) and subscription history. Thus while we
believe that a monetary union promotes market integration – i.e. we will see less of
third degree price discrimination across national borders – we might well get an
increased use of other forms of price discrimination.15
to-market. We leave the development of these ideas for future research.
This paper has tried to make a simple point; a monetary union is likely to
be decisive channel.
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